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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to present reflections on the nature of information management (IM) and its role and function to 
support coordination in one of the largest humanitarian crises of our time, the Syria crisis. Starting from general principles for 
humanitarian information management, we analyze the challenges that information managers face in conflict situations, when 
information is – more than anywhere else – a source of power and influence. This work outlines the interdependence of advocacy 
and operational information management, the sensitivity of information, and barriers to information sharing. The results are 
complex and highly interlaced information and coordination structures that remain unpredictable for many partners. Contrarily, 
natural disasters – such as Typhoon Haiyan – are dominated by high levels of uncertainty; political interests are less pronounced. 
An initial comparison is made between the resulting IM challenges for natural and complex disasters.  
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1. Introduction 
Conflicts such as the on-going crises in the Middle East, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo or South Sudan threaten the lives of millions of people. When conflict erupts, the affected population tries 
to escape the disaster area in search of safety and shelter in temporary transit centers, IDP or refugee camps. 
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According to the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2014, an estimated number of 10.7 million people were 
newly displaced by conflict or persecution in 2013 (vs. 7.6 million in 2012), although the exact numbers remain 
unknown (Swithern, 2014). International humanitarian assistance to IDPs and refugees exceeded 10 billion US$ in 
2010 – not including the important contributions of the host countries and charities (IFRC, 2012). In such arduous 
conditions, particularly cross-border or cross-line operations are highly sensitive (Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 
2009). Despite the human impact of conflict-driven or complex disasters, academic research on humanitarian 
disasters however still mostly focuses on natural and sudden-onset disasters (Galindo & Batta, 2013; Kovács & 
Spens, 2011; Kunz & Reiner, 2013).  
In this paper, we contrast the information management challenges in humanitarian response operations for a 
complex disaster to those during a natural sudden-onset disaster. Our discussion and findings are based on a research 
visit in Amman, Jordan, in May 2014 to study the response to the Syria crisis, and we compare these to the findings 
derived from earlier field work conducted during the response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in December 
2013 (Chan & Comes, 2014; van den Homberg, Meesters, & Van de Walle, 2014).  
In the following Section, we provide a very concise introduction to the Syria crisis, and we describe the 
supporting role of information management to the coordination of the response. Section 3 presents the humanitarian 
information management principles as originally defined by UN OCHA, and our research approach. In Section 4, we 
provide a more in-depth discussion of information sharing, and the possible risks that information sharing entails in 
conflict situations, while Section 5 elaborates on the differences in humanitarian information management principles 
in complex and natural disasters. This analysis is further discussed in Section 6, and conclusions are provided in the 
final Section 7.      
2. Background 
The Syrian conflict that started in March 2011 was formally declared a Level 3 (or L3) humanitarian disaster in 
January 2013. Later that year, and faced with the prospect of a worsening situation inside Syria and continuing 
outflows of refugees in 2014, UN agencies and NGOs active in the region launched the largest appeal or funding 
request for a single humanitarian crisis thus far, amounting to US$6.5 billion in funds. Despite this unprecedented 
appeal, the worsening humanitarian conditions and the large-scale movement of the Syrian population within the 
country and into the neighbouring countries create continuing spill-over effects that further escalate and deepen the 
crisis across the region. The scale and complexity of the political, security, economic, and social consequences have 
stretched resources of societies, governments and the international aid system. Additional humanitarian, 
development and macro-economic challenges have emerged, affecting host communities and countries including the 
latters’ economies, national resilience and social cohesion. Additionally, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL), now known as Islamic State or IS, has created a formidable additional challenge to the international 
community and causes a further destabilisation of the wider region.  
The Information & Analysis Unit (IAU) in Amman was officially established in December 2012 in order to assist 
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in its coordinating role for the international 
humanitarian response to the Syria crisis. The IAU was an integral Information Management (IM) and analysis part 
of the OCHA Syria office, meant to support the OCHA office in Damascus, OCHA offices in neighboring countries, 
the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator (RHC), and other humanitarian stakeholders. With the appointment of Nigel 
Fisher as Resident Humanitarian Coordinator (HRC) in fall of 2013, the IAU became an entity in the RHC Office, 
performing a regional role. 
 The RHC/IAU office in Amman has a regional strategic role to coordination and IM, while the other OCHA 
offices in the region serve different purposes. The OCHA Damascus office is responsible for humanitarian action 
within Syria, although any humanitarian operations within Syria critically depend on government approval and are 
enacted largely by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) and a total of 25 local, obviously government approved, 
NGOs†. The Turkey and Jordan OCHA offices mainly deal with cross border issues. The OCHA office in Erbil and 
 
 
† 2014Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Assistance Plan (SHARP). Available on reliefweb.int: 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2014_Syria_SHARP.pdf  
405 Bartel Van de Walle and Tina Comes /  Procedia Engineering  107 ( 2015 )  403 – 411 
the Lebanon office mainly deal with the local domestic situation, which is obviously heavily influenced by the influx 
of Syrian refugees  
The context of the Syria conflict is clearly highly sensitive and as such advocacy and aid are often (too) closely 
linked. The OCHA headquarters in New York are very involved in impelling the political dimension: the Secretary 
General (SG) reports to the Security Council on a monthly basis. The Coordination and Response Division (CRD) 
supports the Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, in that respect. Given this politicized environment, 
OCHA New York holds a tight grip on any events related to humanitarian action as well as their reporting within 
and around Syria.  
3. The Humanitarian Information Management Principles and our Research Approach  
OCHA is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to 
ensure a coherent response to emergencies. OCHA also ensures there is a framework within which each actor can 
contribute to the overall response effort. OCHA's mission is to mobilize and coordinate effective and principled 
humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in 
disasters and emergencies; advocate the rights of people in need; promote preparedness and prevention; and 
facilitate sustainable solutions. 
Recognizing this pivotal role of information management and analysis, UN OCHA proposed a set of principles 
for humanitarian information management at the 2002 Symposium on Best Practices in Humanitarian Information 
Management and Exchange, later refined and expanded at the 2007 Global Symposium +5 held in Geneva on 22-26 
October 2007 (Van de Walle, Van Den Eede & Muhren, 2009). All principles are listed in Table 1, which also 
presents a structuring into the three broad categories of information checking, sharing and using. The cycle of 
information collection, driven by a specific use, evaluating the information and checking it with other sources, and 
distributing, and sharing it with partners or the public is embedded into the principles listed. Across all categories 
run the remaining Humanitarian Principles that set common standards for any use, verification and sharing of data.  
Information, however, always is a source of influence and power. Therefore, the humanitarian principles are 
often hard to comply with, in particular in conflict settings when sources may intentionally provide wrong 
information, and confidentiality is needed to protect trustworthy sources (Van de Walle, Van Den Eede & Muhren, 
2009). But even in natural disasters, there is growing competition among the aid organizations and scarce 
information may be reluctantly shared, if at all (Thomas, & Kopczak, 2007; van Wassenhove 2006). The central 
question of this paper is then whether the information management practices, in natural as well as in complex crises, 
do support and fulfill those principles. For that purpose, we conducted research at the IAU office in Amman, Jordan, 
and contrasted our findings with earlier results from field research in the Typhoon Haiyan response in the 
Philippines.  
In earlier work presented at this conference in 2014, we have described the field research approach as conducted 
in the Philippines in the aftermath of Haiyan as well as initial results on the coordination and risk management 
processed (Chan & Comes, 2014)(Van de Walle & Comes, 2014; van den Homberg et al., 2014). For the research in 
Amman, the authors combined desktop research and background analyses with interviews that were conducted with 
regional actors in Amman, Jordan. The interviewees were selected with the aim of getting the best possible 
overview on information management processes, information sharing and coordination between organizations. 
Organizations active in the Syria response were interviewed in sessions of typically 1 to 1.5 hours long, and were 
held upon agreed terms of openness and confidentiality. The researchers recorded all interviews, and research notes 
were taken. When requested, specific statements were not included in the notes and audio recording was paused. 
The identity of the source of the citations given in this paper is not disclosed, and attribution is only given in generic 
organizational terms. Interviews were conducted with donors, UN Agencies, and iNGOs. 
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Table 1. Principles for Humanitarian Information Management 
4. Humanitarian Information Management: the dangers of sharing - and not sharing 
Since Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos declared an L3 Humanitarian System-Wide Emergency for 
Syria on January 15, 2013, the humanitarian community has scaled up its efforts and many organizations have since 
run into their organizational limits. Despite the long history of conflicts in the Middle East, it is clear that the very 
nature of the Syria crisis lead the humanitarian community into uncharted territories. Our findings indicated that 
many organizations struggled to maintain their standards and stick to the humanitarian IM principles listed in 
Function Principle Explanation 
Check Reliability Users must be able to evaluate the reliability and credibility of data and information 
by knowing its source and method of collection. Collection methods should adhere to 
global standards where they exist to support and reinforce credibility. Reliability is a 
prerequisite for ensuring validity and verifiability. 
Verifiability Information should be accurate, consistent and based on sound methodologies, 
validated by external sources, and analysed within the proper contextual framework. 
Share Inter-
operability 
All sharable data and information should be made available in formats that can be 
easily retrieved and shared by humanitarian organizations. 
Accessibility Humanitarian information and data should be made accessible to all humanitarian 
actors by applying easy-to-use formats and by translating information into common 
or local languages. Information should be widely distributed through a variety of 
online and offline distribution channels including the media. 
Sustainability Humanitarian information and data should be preserved, catalogued and archived, so 
that it can be retrieved for preparedness, analysis, and evaluation. When possible, 
post emergency data should be transitioned to relevant recovery actors and host 
governments and training provided on its use. 
Use Timeliness Humanitarian information should be collected, analysed and disseminated efficiently, 
and must be kept current. 
Relevance Information should be practical, flexible, responsive, and driven by operational 
needs in support of decision-making throughout all phases of a crisis. Data that is not 





Inclusiveness Information management should be based on collaboration, partnership and sharing 
with a high degree of participation and ownership by multiple stakeholders 
including national and local governments, and affected communities. 
Accountability Information providers should be responsible to their partners and stakeholders for 
the content they publish and disseminate. 
Impartiality Information managers should consult a variety of sources when collecting and 
analysing information so as to provide varied and balanced perspectives for 
addressing problems and recommending solutions. 
Humanity Information should never be used to distort, to mislead or to cause harm to affected 
or at risk populations and should respect the dignity of victims. 
Reciprocity Information exchange should be a beneficial two-way process between the affected 
communities and the humanitarian community, including affected governments. 
Confidential-
ity 
The processing of any personal data shall not be done without the prior explicit 
description of its purpose and will only be done for that purpose, and after prior 
informed consent of the individual concerned. Sufficient safeguards must be put in 
place to protect personal data against loss, unauthorized processing and other misuse. 
If sensitive information is publicly disclosed, the sources of such information will not 
be released when there is a reasonable risk that doing so will affect the security or 
integrity of these sources. 
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Table 1 above. In Syria, it is impossible to separate operational from strategic or political information. “More than 
anywhere else, information is power here”, one interviewee said. For humanitarian information management, this 
complexity has consistently rendered the execution of even the most basic information processes a challenging task.  
4.1. Advocacy-Driven Design of Information Products  
The information tasks of the IAU Office are daunting: beyond the lack of confirmed or official statistics that can 
be evaluated and verified concerning the actual situation within Syria, challenges with respect to the processing of 
information are many: standard formats are lacking or the agreed upon formats change; information is variably sent 
in Arabic or in English, and often information needs to be processed on a very short notice, and. templates, even 
when available, are frequently not adhered to. These difficulties make the timely provision of information products 
that support operational decision-making problematic.  
Data must often be collected at the IAU office on a very short notice, driven by ad-hoc requests to support 
advocacy and strategic decision-making at headquarter levels. As OCHA requests the needed data from its 
humanitarian partners, a clear motivation for such requests can often not be provided – because the IAU office itself 
is often unaware of it. This clearly leads to frustration among the partners who don’t know why they have to provide 
the information requested, and for which purpose. Several of our interviewees expressed their frustration with this 
process, and felt that as the IAU Office is just feeding information up to New York they have information about 
what is done with their data, let alone have control over it.   
To address the problem of lacking standards and automation, the IAU Office has introduced standardizing 
technologies to facilitate collaboration among OCHA offices, most notably through the use of ARCGIS Online. This 
has led to common data structures and data sets, yet a GIS Working Group was not in place during the time of our 
visit and coordination for GIS was perceived as lacking.  
The otherwise highly regarded and well known humanitarian websites Reliefweb and Humanitarian.info were 
widely seen as useless in the Syria Crisis. The information was often found to be outdated, since Reliefweb 
publishes only finalized reports. Several interviewees referred to the UNHCR portal as the only information portal 
they check for up to date information.  
The credibility and accuracy of sources is equally difficult. IM staff puts considerable effort into identifying the 
most credible sources, and comparing information of different origins to avoid the perception of being inaccurate – 
or risking a conflict with other, officially stated information. Similar as for sensitive data, clear guidelines appeared 
to be missing in order to educate IM staff to work with inaccurate data and, for instance, to introduce error bars or 
margins on the fact sheets and maps that are being produced - rather than striving for absolute, and unrealistic, 
accuracy.  
4.2. Information sensitivity as a reality and as an excuse 
Most interviewees seem utterly confused and increasingly frustrated by the sensitivity of information, and the 
lack of guidance on how to handle it. Several interviewees stated that data was often lost in confidentiality concerns. 
The resulting confusion was used as an excuse to hide information.   
A key problem is that there is no information about interventions within Syria, although that is, in the words of 
one of the interviewees, “the biggest piece of the cake”. Information is largely only available bilaterally and 
informally. Information on planned interventions is not shared. Or rather, it is not shared officially, since the body of 
knowledge on who delivers what and where (at least roughly) appears considerable among all interviewees.  
During one of the interviews, one donor stated that the issues of confidentiality and security concerns are not 
new, and they are common for all complex crises, and should definitely not come as a surprise in the Middle East. 
The donor expressed its strong dismay that, in the fourth year of the crisis, no clear protocols and instructions has as 
yet been set up. As a consequence, the humanitarian community must work in a very fragmented information 
landscape, which is characterized by secrecy, mistrust and a strong role of individual networks. 
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4.3. Information Sharing – Official Reporting vs. Under the Table 
Information Management Officers (IMOs) are working in conditions characterized by high levels of sensitivity 
and confidentiality of information. As there is no protocol on how IMOs should deal with such information, the 
prevailing mode of official operation is to stick to secrecy – unless explicitly told otherwise by their superiors. Some 
of our interviewees, GIS experts, expressed their concern in making maps with possibly contentious information, 
and hence they produced mostly basic, harmless and redundant maps.  
The active presence and accumulation of global intelligence services in the region also created a strong belief that 
all information sent out from any humanitarian office is intercepted and read. Under-cover intelligence officers were 
assumed to be present in every public interaction. These beliefs have penetrated into the humanitarian organizations 
own procedures. During our interviews, we were told several anecdotes that seem to be inspired by scenes from cold 
war spy movies, ranging from anonymous email accounts set up by an office to spread information without formal 
approval, to handing over maps in hotel rooms so that they could be secretly photographed.  
This atmosphere of mistrust is ubiquitous, and hampers exchange even of such information that is common 
knowledge between all actors. At the same time, trusted individual relations and networks for information sharing 
have become ever more important. One of the most frequently heard expressions during our interviews was sharing 
“under the table”. This gives rise to two networks and channels of information sharing: the official reporting 
network, communicating mostly upwards to headquarters, and a largely uncontrolled information sharing network 
that support operational decision making, but make the official system almost obsolete. These networks are so 
strong and important that they may undermine all attempts of structuring information flows or establishing protocols 
for sharing in future.  
The dominance of advocacy over operations clearly leads hampers operations – (i) because it absorbs most IM 
resources, and (ii) because the information collected is not shared at an operational level. Interviewees stated that 
they only frequently did not see products created from their data until months later – if at all. One interviewee stated, 
however, that if there would be a sharing agreement with the UN agencies not to use information provided by 
OCHA beyond operational level, then “agencies would subscribe to this”. In particular, it was clear that iNGOs 
would not share their operational data in the absence of such an agreement, as they were deeply concerned that their 
information would be processed, shared too widely and beyond their control.  
As in other crises, IMOs and other humanitarian staff typically stay on their post between six and twelve months, 
without any clear protocols or guidance that organizes handover, or supports parallel work. Regularly, information 
and knowledge are therefore lost when people leave. It is always a challenge to maintain that knowledge. But 
particularly in a crisis that is so difficult to manage as the situation in Syria, and in which information management 
rely so much on individual social network, this comes down to an organizational form “designed to forget” – 
instead of the ideal of a learning organization. More time could be invested at the IAU office for training on the job, 
supervision in the first weeks, and overlapping working cycles. 
5. Discussion: Natural vs Complex Disasters 
In both natural and complex disasters, IMOs work to collect relevant data and convert these into information 
products such as situation reports or maps. One of the most important challenges is to create products that are useful 
in dynamic and uncertain contexts. Here, we contrast our findings from Amman with previous research we have 
conducted in the response to Typhoon Haiyan, where the main challenge and root of difficulty was widely perceived 
as very short time, and the lack of infrastructure in the affected areas. In the case of Haiyan, time pressure favored 
production of standardized products and formats that have been used for other sudden onset disasters. For instance 
common operational data sets, including population data, geographic data, structural data, i.e. important in-
frastructures such as roads, or ports, are an example of UN OCHA standardized information products that were 
present and described as highly relevant in both disasters.     
The assumed advantage of standardization is that it can result in highly efficient operations, because it is known 
beforehand which information needs to be collected, and how it needs to be visualized. Hence, IM activities become 
more predictable and potentially reliable, referring to a set of ‘standard’ products that can be updated on a regular 
basis, and when shared openly can create a transparent information flow despite the potential ad-hoc craziness that is 
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typical for the early phases of disaster response. The aim of OCHA’s IM in Haiyan was in many cases related to 
setting up and maintaining such a regular and reliable product cycle to facilitate communication with the clusters 
space, and to enable better planning of information-related vs. operational response activities.  
At the same time reacting on the numerous requests by providing standardized and well-known products did not 
leave room for reflection on (i) how the purpose of a specific request can best be served; (ii) if the request is related 
to products that have already been created; (iii) which format or visualization is best for the purpose. Standardization 
provides a reliable structure but comes at the cost of flexibility, which may be a necessary in the acute phases of 
humanitarian interventions. If information is missing or can’t be formatted to fit the standardized form, often, new 
information collection efforts are initiated – to fill the unintentional gap. For example, traditional agencies will 
duplicate assessment efforts to fit standardize formats for their organization despite the fact that this information 
may already be (partially) available at a local level, owned by other authorities or organizations, but often in 
unfamiliar formats. This is particularly relevant concerning the interface with national, local authorities and the 
population, but also play in the UN information management, where for example certain NGOs preferred to put their 
scarce time in managing their own more granular data rather than to provide data to the headquarters in Manila. 
Conversely, data from local actors in the field that did not meet the imposed data standards often could not easily be 
included in the international humanitarian system reporting mechanisms. 
 
Table 2. Observations 
 
Function Principle Observations 
Jordan / Syria Crisis Philippines / Haiyan 
Use  Timeliness Products not timely because of long time 
to collect, compare and process 
information within the hierarchy 
Standardized products available in 
relatively short time, sometimes at the 
cost of not answering to specific 
information requests 
Relevance Information dominated by advocacy and 
strategic considerations; operationally 
relevant information, even 3 or 4Ws in 
many cases not available, particularly for 
cross border, or cross line operations 
Information driven by requests from 
headquarters, operational requests often 
only answers within networks of peers 
Check Reliability Data about the situation within Syria in 
many cases lacking or not available. 
Reliability varying with the access to the 
regions affected; problematic particularly 
in the early phases, or if data was only 
evaluated remotely (Westrope, Banick, & 
Levine, 2014); CODs and information 
from the ministries said to be of 
“exceptional quality” 
Verifiability Protection of sources hampers 
verifiability, and required careful cross 
checking, in many cases leading to 
rumours and adding to the atmosphere of 
mistrust  
Hampered in the early phases by access 
and lack of communication, particularly 
in remote regions. 
Share Inter-
operability 
Shifting formats in different languages, 
however, attempts for standardisation 
using ARCGIS and online tools. 
Difficulty to interact with charities, 
particularly from the Gulf States that 
follow their own norms and rules 
(Cotterrell & Harmer, 2005) 
Difficulty of ad-hoc alignment of local 
actors, national government and military, 
regional actors (ASEAN) and the UN 
System (van den Homberg et al., 2014) 
Accessibility Often, information was not available to 
many humanitarian partners; particularly 
Common Operational Datasets (CODs) 
and other basic information needed to be 
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6. Conclusions 
Information management is fundamental for the coordination of international humanitarian response, yet at the 
same time provides great challenges. The information that is being used for the purpose of coordination clearly is 
intended to lead to improving the lives of those affected by the disaster. Yet, this very information can become a 
threat endangering these very lives, if it is inaccurate, misleading or falls in the hands of malevolent groups. In the 
past decade, so-called humanitarian information principles have been identified to guide the processes of collecting, 
checking, sharing and using information. The information products that are produced to support the coordination 
must take these principles into account, yet our findings from field research in a natural and complex disaster setting 
 
 
‡ see http://www.comminit.com/media-development/content/radyo-bakdaw-rise 
§ http://www.cebu.gov.ph/typhoon-yolanda-updates/   
operational information improved and completed during the 
response. Because of the high pressure, 
this happened often in parallel in 
government agencies and by iNGOs 
(Ebener, Castro, & Dimailig, 2014). 
Sustainability Shifting formats and lack of data sharing 
and storage protocols makes it difficult to 
analyse data about the first years of the 
disaster.  
Lessons learned in progress and 
published by different agencies 





Inclusiveness Information not shared with humanitarian 
partners and the local population, driven 
by protection concerns 
Projects such as the Internews Project 
Radyo Bakdaw‡ (“rise”), and self-
organized community activities such as 
paglig on§ in Cebu supporting the 
communication with the local population 
Accountability Perception of “losing control” once 
information is reported to UN agencies or 
headquarters; often unclear use of 
information 
Reporting and processing of information 
perceived as slow, but transparent  
Impartiality Attempt to provide a well-balanced 
picture hampered by mistrust and barriers 
of information sharing; access is the 
determinant, not balance 
3 Aim to cover different vulnerable 
groups, political parties etc.  
Humanity Ever present in the protection of refugees, 
and the communications around cross-
border and cross line operations  
3 
Reciprocity Not achieved, owing to the disconnect 
among humanitarian actors, and the lack 
of access to the population within Syria 
In the early phases, hierarchical 
communication structures were 
dominating; later on – in the transition to 
recovery – also more participatory 
communication lines (DEC/HC, 2014) 
Confidential-
ity 
Of paramount importance, and the 
guiding principle to handle data from 
refugees and IDPs; general assumption is 
that all information is confidential, 
leading to a lack of situational overview 
and forestalling the possibility for joint 
planning and strategy building 
Not of major concern 
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indicate that in both disaster types this is extremely challenging. In natural disaster response, the processes leading 
to information products are more ‘tried and tested’ and streamlined. The resulting automation of standard products, 
however, may reduce the flexibility in tailoring to actual needs, or even prevent the actual verification altogether 
whether the products meet the needs for which they were generated in the first place. In complex disaster response, 
information sensitivity and a lack of adequate procedures to handle it may lead to an exaggerated concern for 
security to a lowest denominator in information product quality as only that information of which one is absolutely 
certain is being published. Future research should further investigate these observations that were, clearly, deduced 
from a very small sample only. We hope that such further analysis will lead to a much needed better understanding 
of humanitarian information management, whether in the context of natural or complex disasters. 
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